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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JOHN 0. FARNSVVORTH and '
SHARON ANNETTE FARNSWORTH, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

SOTER'S INC., a corporation,
Defendant and rPhird-Party
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No.
11626

HOBERT B. S\V ANER and LOUISE
S.
his wife, SALT LAKE
cot:NTY, a body politic, and SAl\I F.
SOI'ER, individually,
Third-Party Defendants and
Respondents.

BRIEF OF SOTER'S INC. DEFENDANT AND
THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF AND OF SALT
LAKE COUNTY, THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT AND
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Plaintiffs, by their brief, have attempted, for the
first time, to make this an action for either condemnation
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or inverse condemnation. However, the pleadings and
evidence do not substantiate such a case as Plaintiffs
in their First Cause of Action are seeking alleged darn.
ages for the removal of an alleged right of way and
in their Second Cause of Action are seeking restoration
of said non-existant right of way.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff and Re- ,
spondent, Soter's Inc., as well as the Third Party De- i
fendants and Respondents, seek to have the lower
court's Judgment of Dismissal dated lVIarch 3, 1969
affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants, in their brief, have set forth a state·
ment of facts which the Respondents feel contains
some statements which are without support in the evi·
dence and some facts that are either omitted or mis·
conceive the pleadings and which are based upon
suppositions or assumptions and are sought to draw
unfair inferences. Therefore, it becomes inherent that
the Respondent restate the facts in order that they may
be correctly viewed.
Plaintiff, John 0. Farnsworth, acquired the prop·
erty, the subject of this lawsuit, as set forth in Plain·
tiffs' Complaint, together with the property to the East
South and West, including that property conveyed to
2
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Happy \Talley Inc. (Exhibit D-12) and that property
coll;'eyed to Plaintiff, John 0. Farnsworth's, sister
E\h1biL D-13) consisting of approximately 120 acres
1
in all, from Florence N. Stoven on June 7, 1943 (T. 17\l and 185, Exhibit P-4).

At the time Plaintiff acquired said 120 acres oj
property there was a roadway running in an easterly
and westerly direction North of but not contiguous to
the North property line of Plaintiffs' property known
a11d referred to as Creek Road (approximately 8200
South Street) to a point approximately 10 feet 8 inches
North and a little to the East of Plaintiffs' property,
the subjed of this lawsuit, at which point said roadway
turned North and ran northward to the bridge crossing
Little Cottonwood Creek (Exhibit D-9).
There was an opening in the fence running along
the North boundary of Plaintiffs' property at the
extreme northwest boundary of said property which
Plaintiffs used to gain access onto the property conveyeJ to Plaintiff, John 0. Farnsworth's, sister and
brother-in-law under date of March 23, 1959 (Exhibit
D-13) and that remaining in the name of Plaintiffs.
This opening still exists, is now, and has been at all times
used by either Plaintiffs or John 0. Farnsworth's
sister and brother-in-law (Jessops) , and has not been
altered in any way, shape or form. There absolutely
irere no other openings adjacent to or abutting any of
Plaintiffs' property now owned or formerly owned by
Plaintiffs, along the North boundary of the property
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of the Plaintiffs and the South boundary of the proper\\
known and referred to as Oak Creek Estates Xo.
which was formerly owned by the Defendants and ](t
1
spondents, Swaners, and which is now owned by Soter
Inc. The Salt Lake County Surveyor's Office has maJ,
three ( 3) separate surveys of the old and new roadwa1,
and surrounding properties and said three ( 3) separat
surveys have been specifically tied into one anothu
and correlated into Exhibits D-9 and D-19. ExMn
D-9 emphatically shows that the southern most portlo!i .
of the oiled portion of the old road varied in distai1cr '
from 14 feet 6 inches to 7 feet 6 inches from the Nurlli
boundary of Plaintiffs' original property and also sho11i
that the South portion of the old roadway was co11·
siderably higher in elevation than the North boundan 1
of the Plaintiffs' property, either in its original stair
or as presently existing.
The old roadway has been left intact in front 01
the property formerly owned by Plaintiffs, but nm·.
owned by Jessop's (Exhibits P-1, P-2, P-3, D-9, D-Jll.1
D-11, and D-13).
The Plaintiffs on April 10, 1958 by Warrann
Deed, conveyed all of their property abutting their
present one acre on the East and South to Happi.
Valley Inc. (Exhibit D-12) and all of the propert.1
to the West of said one acre tract to Plaintiff, Jon11
0. Farnsworth's, sister and brother-in-law, David L
Jessop and Noleen F. Jessop, his wife, on March z:i.
1959 as is shown by Exhibit D-13, without reservini
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any entrance whatsoever to the remammg one acre,
either from the West, or the East, or the South. Plaintiffs, of course, had absolutely no other opening to their
remaining acre at any point along the South side of said
old roadway other than that conveyed to Jessops by
the above mentioned Deed.
The property conveyed to Happy Valley Inc. has
been developed into Willow Creek Subdivision No. 2
(Exhibit P-2) with the South portion of Plaintiffs'
and Plaintiff, John 0. Farnsworth' s sister and brotheri11-law, N oleen F. Jessop and David L. Jessop's, property abutting Rubidoux Road. Both Plaintiffs and the
Jessops have a ready-made access to the South portion
1Jf their respective properties by merely reimbursing
the Willow Creek subdividers for a nominal sum
for said protective strip as is outlined in Exhibit D-18.
Salt Lake County, because of a hazardous conditon of said old roadway, (T. - 185 and 186) on September 15, 1958 and September 17, 1958 (Exhibits
D-17 and D-16) exchanged Quitclaim Deeds with
Third-Party Defendants Swaners, with Third-Party
Defendants Swaners quitclaim:!ng any interest in and
to the new realignment of Creek Road as shown on
Exhibits D-9, D-10, and D-11, to Salt Lake County
and Salt Lake County quitclaimiug any interest in
the old 8200 South Street known as Creek Road to
Third-Party Defendants, Swaners, and which property
was later transferred to Defendant and Third-Party
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Plaintiff, Soter's Inc., and is evidenced by Exhibit\
D-15 and D-24.

The realignment of the new 8200 South Street wa 1 1
made by Salt Lake County in the late summer or earh
fall of 1959 with the new roadway being paved in tr;e
spring of 1960. A pile of dirt was put on the old
roadway stopping access to the use of same at a point
East of the opening into the Jessop property and the
County scarified the entire rest of the old roadway
to Little Cottonwood Creek. Said old roadway remained ·
blocked and scarified until approximately June 11,
1964 at which time Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff, Soter's Inc., caused the old roadway to be completely obliterated. There is no dispute as to when the 1
new realignment took place but there is some dispute ·
between the parties hereto as to how long the Plaintiffs
continued to use the old roadway. However, no complaint was made by Plaintiffs whatsoever from 1959
until approximately September 12, 1964 at which time
Sam F. Soter of Soter' s Inc. requested the use of the
Jessop's telephone because of car trouble and at this
time Mrs. Jessop discussed said old roadway with Mr.
Soter (T. - 208 and 215, Deposition - Page 13).
1

1
,

Plaintiff, John 0. Farnsworth, by his testimony :
stated that he had not planted, used, grazed, or built
or requested permission to build upon the one acre of
property, or lived there, at any time from the time
the property was sold to Happy Valley Inc. or h11
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sister, which amounts to approximately seven years
('f.-205, 206, and 216, Deposition-Pages 11and12).
The Third-Party Defendants, Swaners, sold the
property known as Oak Creek Estates No. 3 (Exhibit
P-l), together with other property, to Sam F. Soter
oil or about l\1-ay 15, 1959 with title passing to Sam F.
Soter on .J\ilay 29, 1964 (Exhibit D-15) and the same
being transferred by deed to Defendant and ThirdParty Plaintiff, Soter's Inc., the same day (Exhibit
D-24<). Soter's Inc. did not include into Oak Creek
Estates No. 3 the triangular 115 foot by 39.17 foot
strip shown on Exhibits P-1, D-10, and D-11 beginning
at a point 1,901.66 feet East of the Southwest corner
of the Northeast quarter of Section 34, Township 2.f$v..t{ 1
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; the
road and access to the property now owned by Jessops,
and formerly owned by Plaintiffs, was left intact.
The Plaintiffs now have the same openings as
they always had into their property except that they
choose to convey the only opening to Jessops in 1959
!Exhibits P-2, P-3 and D-13) and to landlock themselves on the East and South when they conveyed to
Happy Valley Inc. in 1958, as shown by Exhibits P-2,
P-3 and D-12.
ARGUMENT
Point 1. THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT
BREN DEPRIVED OF PROPERTY WITH7

OUT DUE PROCESS OF LA \V OR COMPEX
SATION.
It appears that the Plaintiffs have misconceive,
their own case as their entire argument contained •.·
Point 1 lies solely in quotations from the Fifth a1 1
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution as Wt
as recitations from surrounding states' cases and otht
cases sounding solely in condemnation and inverse c01,
demnation.

Neither Plaintiffs' pleadings nor any evideur
adduced at the trial sounds whatsoever either in emine:
domain or inverse condemnation. The only place th•
such argument is treated is in Plaintiffs' brief
stated above, is not substantiated whatsoever by eith'
the pleadings or the evidence and therefore should n'
be considered here.
The Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff, Sotei
Inc., does not come within the classification of 1:
parties allowed to invoke the rights of the emintr
domain statutes as set forth in Title 78 Chapter :r
Utah Code Annotated 1953, and the doctrine of "ime1:
condemnation" has been repeatedly rejected in ii
State of Utah as is evidenced by the cases of fa
clough v. Salt Lake County et al., 10 U.2d Jr
354 P.2d 105, and Sine v. Helland et.al., 18 U.2d
418 P.2d 979 and ancillary cases referred to in e:
of said cases.
Plaintiffs attempt to apply some condemnationa
8

j111 erse

eondemnation rules to the instant case by claimiiw that their property abuts the Defendant and Thirdb
Party Plaintiff and Respondent's property upon which
tlie ol<l road was and by alleging that they are abutters
and that they own to the center of the old roadway,
11 hich "va·; North some 7 to 15 feet of the Defendant's
;.;odli property line. Plaintiffs also allege that if they
cannot become abutters then they have a right by prescription, which argument is also fallacious.
To show the fallacy jn Plaintiffs' contention as
being an abutter and having rights, either as an abutter
or a prescriptive right, it is necessary that we look to
tlie true definition of these respective words which Plaintiffs seem to have overlooked.
Corpus Juris Secundum in 1 C.J.S. 406 defines
"abut" as follows:
"ARUT. In its most ordinary sense, "abut"
means to be contiguous, or border on; to bound
upon; to end, end at, or terminate, to join at
a border or boundary; to meet; to touch at the
end or side. Usually "abut" implies contact, but
this is not always so.

Phrases: *Abubagainst• the solid rock,"
on the highway," "abuts or adjoins," "abuts upon
the improvement," and "abuts upon the street."
"Abutting" is a word of common usage, having a definite, well understood meaning, as well
in legal as in common parlance. It has been defined as meaning adjacent; adjoining; coming
together; contiguous; ending; joined to; meeting; touching. It has been said that it conveys
9

the idea of bordering on, bounded by, with not/1
ing intervening. While the word "abutting" ma 1

not imply that the things spoken of are nece;
sarily in contact, the usual meaning conveyeu
is that of touching or coming together. (Em.
phasis added)

In a narrow and restricted sense the term b
used in reference to that which touches at tht
end as distinguished from that which adjoin1
it on the side. In ordinary usage, however, it;,
said to have no restricted sense, but to refer to
that which touches other premises whether ai
the ends or on the sides; and it has also been
said not to include land lying wholly within,
although in a particular connection, the use oi'
the word may convey the idea of abutting ana
lying partially within.
"Abutting" has been distinguished from "ad
jacent_" "fronting," "occupying," and "tributary."
Phrases: "Abutting, adjoining, contiguous,
"abutting and occupying," "abutting, contiguou1
and tributary," "abutting each other," "abutting
its line," "abutting lands," "abutting lot," abut·
ting on or adjacent to," "abutting on such lat·
erals," "abutting on the improvement,"
or adjacent real estate," "abutting or fronting.
"abutting owner," "abutting platted lots," "ab.ul·
property," "abutting property owner," "abuttmi
railroad property,"" 'abutting' the street," "abut
ting unplatted property," "abutting
ad
jacent, vicinal or proximate to the street, abut:
ting upon such avenue," "abutting upon the str.ee!
or streets," "adjacent or abutting," "borderW
or abutting upon street or streets," "contiguow
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property abutting," "facing or abutting upon
the improvement," "fronting or abutting feet,"
"fronting or abutting upon," "lands not immediately abutting,' 'and "occupying or abutting
any highway."
ABUTTER. One whose property abuts, is
contiguous, or joins at a border or boundary,
as where no other land, road, or street intervenes ; the word has sometimes been spelled
"abuttor." "
Black's Law Dictionary Third Edition, Pages 18
and 19 define "abutter" and "abutting owner" as follows;

"ABUTTER. One whose property abuts, is
contiguous, or joins at a border or boundary as
where no other land, road, ort:eet intervenes.
ABUTTING OWNER.
owner of land
which abuts or adjoins. The term usually implies that the relative parts actually adjoin, but
is sometimes loosely used without implying more
than close proximity. See Abut."
The most recently legal dictionary, namely, Ballentine's Law Dictionary Third Edition 1969, at Pages
8 and 9 defines "abut" and "abutting owner" as follows:
"ABUT. To end at; to border on; to reach
or touch with an end, as where a lot touches the
highway. Hensler v. Anacortes, 140 Wash 184,
248 p 406.
ABUTTING O':VNERS. Those owners
whose lands touch a highway or other public
place. I Am J2d Adj L § I; 25 Am Jlst High
§ 153.

11

. It is
to limit the meaning of "a bu
tmg owners to lands bordering a highway a11 ,
not to speak of lands as "adjoining" a high 11 ::·,
but the usefulness of a distinction in legal arfo:
between lands that abut on a highway and ::ii
joining lands generally, arbitrary awl
although it may be, is not to be derned. J \
J2d Adj L §I."
.'
The term "abutter" or "abutting owner" is som
times referred to as adjoining land owner and I ,:\1
J2d 691 and U92 defines "adjoinng landOWllCl'S I
follows:
"As the term is used in legal termi11olog:
"adjoining landowners" are the owners of lm11,
that are separated by a common boundary. 'l'J;
word "lands" includes to\',:n and city lots \\t
as rural property. Lands have been held lo ar:
join, within this rule, although they are sep,
rated by a public street. "Adjoining
however, are held to be premises which toUt
or are connected with premises of another, ,
distinguished from premises lying near or uiJ
jacen! thereto. The ordinary meaning oft!.
words "contiguous territory" is not territor
nearby in the neighborhood or locality, but lt:
ritory touching, adjoining, and connecting, :
distinguished from territory separated by oth1
territory. The word "adjoining" implies coni
guity in describing lands.
Lands which lie along, and are bordered h,
a highway "adjoin" the highway in a lite1
sense of the word, but as used in this work a1'
in legal literature generally, the phrase "abutti11
owners" is used to designate those whose Ian
touch a highway or other public place. The di·
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tinction is wholly arbitrary, but it answers a
useful purpose in that it gives a definite and
distinctive classification and avoids confusion
that might otherwise arise.
In considering the rights, duties, and liabilitiles of adjoining landowners, it should be kept
in mind that land has in its legal signification an
indefinite extent upward, and includes everything terrestrial, not only the ground or soil, but
everything which is attached to the earth,
whether by the course of nature, as trees, herbage, and water, or by the hands of man, as houses
and other buildings."
It is evident from the foregoing definitions as well
as the exhibits and evidence before the court that it is
!illpossible for the Plaintiffs to be classified as an abutting property owner when in fact their property line
ends at the section line and the old roadway was a
considerable distance North of the section line and
property line and at a different elevation than Plaintiffs' property with no openings being available or ever
having been used by the Plaintiffs from their North
boundary to said old roadway (T. - 197, 203, and 246,
Deposition Pages 5 and 15) except the one opening
into Plaintiff, John 0. Farnsworth's, sister and brotherin-law's, Jessop's, place which has not been altered by
either the Defendant or by any of the Third-Party
Defendants (Exhibit D-10 and D-ll) and which is
in its original location and condition.
Plaintiffs admit both from the evidence (T. - 181)
and in their own brief that the old roadway was created
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by prescription and by public dedication and that thtl't
were no openings that had been used on the Plaintitt,
North property line except that into what is now kn 0111 ,
as the Jessop property formerly owned by the Plain.
tiffs and conveyed to Jessops ( T. - 202) .
It has been stated that any person capable 111
receiving a grant of an easement may acquire one n:
prescription. \Vhile legally organized or political e11 .
tities may acquire an easement by prescription, the
general public is incapable of receiving a grant and
hence, according to some courts, cannot acquire a prescriptive easement. Bertolina v. Frates, 89 Utah
57 P2d 346. Nor can one acquire title by adverse uset
where his use is as a member of the public, in comrno11
with all others exercising and enjoying the pririlege
of use, Simmons v. Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 118 Piu
740, since the use in such a case is not exclusive. i.i
Am J ur 2d, § 40 and 41 on Prescription.

An easement may be acquired by prescription li1
private property; but, by the weight of authority, it
cannot be so acquired in property held for public use
28 C.J.S.
§9(c).
The Plaitdiffs at page 8 of their brief cite Utal1
Road Commission v. Hansen, 14
305, 383 Pac.2a
917, in support of their position, however, this case also
specifies as follows:
"Absent an established easement, all that abul·
ting owner is entitled to is some reasonable mearn
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of access to highway the same as all other members of the public."
"Owners of property abutting on a street were
not entitled to additional compensation on ground
that limitation of access would lessen value of
the remainng land should they desire to divide
and sell it into smaller pieces."
In the instant case the Plaintiff's were not abutters,

did not have a prescriptive easement as they never, as
the evidence overwhelmingly substantiates, had an opening in their fence nor used the property all along the
North boundary of their remaining property to gain
access to the old roadway for the reason that the street
was further to the North than their North boundary
and also that there was no opening other than that
transferred by the Plaintiffs to the Jessops, as well
as there being a difference in elevation (Exhibit D-9).
Therefore, they had no easement, could not lose something they never had and were not entitled to, and were
not abutting property owners and under any stretch
of the imagination could not own to the center of a road
which was on someone else's property.
There is absolutely no dispute that when the new
road was opened up in 1959 the general public specifically used that road from that time on. Salt Lake
County abandoned said old road, having transferred
same to Third-Party Defendants, Swaners, and Swaners in turn having transferred said old roadway to
Sam F. Soter, Third-Party Defendant and Respondent,
who in turn transferred same to the Defendant and

15
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-h'tf

,

Third-Party Defc:atknt, Soter s Inc. The old road
being a public dedicated roadway, and the public ha 1 11 ,
been furnished a means of reasonable access, the Plaii:
tiffs, still retaining the access that they already had.
certainly had no reason to complain\ at a subsetpieul ·
date because they landlocked themselves.
Plaintiffs have a better and paved street with curb anu
gutter which they can acquire from the developers 01
Willow Creek Subdivision by paying a nominal surn
as is evidenced by Exhibit D-18.
j

Assuming that the Plaintiffs are abutters, whicl1
we expressly deny, and quoting from Plaintiffs' 01111
brief at Page 18, Plaintiffs specify as follows:
"Before an abutter is entitled to compensatio11
for the impairment of his access rights, he mu1:
show that he suffers a special injury,
in kind and not merely in degree from that suf·
fered by the public in general."
"The.!hutter is not entitled to access at all point·
of his property, and as long as a suitable mm'
of
to him, he has suffered no lega1
. .access is left
,,
lllJUry . . .
Here Plaintiffs, even if abutters, which they an
not, have suffered no injury as they still would han
had the same access, if they had not conveyed it to tn1
Jessops, as they had prior to the installation of tli'
new roadway.
Plaintiffs at Page 21 of their brief improper]:,
attempt to invoke a 1965 Session Law to the instanr
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case and attempt to retroactively apply same in connedion with the abandonment of the old highway,
which, by Defendant's contention, was in 1959 and by
Plaintiffs' contention, was in 1963 and/or 1964. This
theory, of eourse, must also fail for two reasons: ( 1)
Said law cannot be applied retroactively, and (2) said
law would not be applicable even if in force at the time
of abandonment for the reasons previously stated.
Point 2. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN
DEXYING PLAINTIFFS A JURY TRIAL.
Plaintiffs, in their argument of Point 2, again
attempt to imply that they have been denied due process by asserting that it is a fundamental procedure
and right in American Jurisprudence to have a jury
trial and that same should not be lightly denied.
It will be noted that Plaintiffs filed their Complaint
iu the Salt Lake County Clerk's Office on 1\-larch 17,
1906, their Motion of Readiness on February 6, 1967,

said case had been pretried and many Motions heard,
yet Plaintiffs' Notice and lVIotion for a Jury Trial was
uot made until February 14, 1969, just a few days
prior to the time the case was set for trial, which would
appear to be just a little bit tardy.
This court has ruled on this question on many
occasions and this matter of demand for a jury trial
is covered by the following:
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH: Art. 1, §
10 - Trial by Jury - "In capital cases the right
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of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In courb
of general jurisdiction, except in capital cases
a jury shall consits of eight jurors. In eourts 0;
inferior jurisdiction a jury shall eonsist of tom
jurors. In criminal cases the verdict shall 11,
unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of tht ·
jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil case
shall be waived unless demanded."
added)
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PHCJO:
DURE: Rule 38 (b) Demand - "Any pai\1
may demand a trial by jury of any issue triahl,
of right by a jury by paying the statutory jm:1
fee and serving upon the other parties a demann
therefor in writing at a11y time after the com·
mencement of the action and not later than shali
be fixed by rule of the court in which the action
is pend_in__g. Such demand may be indorsed upo11
a pleading of the party."
RULES OF PRACTICE IN THE DlS
TRICT COURT OF THE THIRD Jrm
CIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE m
UTAH: Rule 8 Jury Demand - "Any cast
originally set for trial without a jury may nmr·
theless be set for jury trial, provided that writte11
notice and payment of the jury fee be deposite I
with the clerk of the court not later than the pn
trial conference of said action."
1

This court in Thompson et ux, v. Anderson et ni
107 U.331, 153 P2d 665, says as follows:
"It is a matter of discretion with the court to
allow or refuse a demand for a jury, when no
made within statutory time or extended tm11
provided by court rule, and it is not an abui
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of discretion to refuse a late demand for jury
trial if no excuse is shown for failure to make
timely demand."
The court, in the same case, further specifies as
follows:
"\Vhere Defendant filed motion for jury trial
after case was set on nonjury calendar, but not
within required time limit as provided by court
rule, extending statutory time limit for such
motion, and, gave as justification therefor that
he was giving consideration to overtures of plaintiffs which tended toward settlement of case,
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
motion."
See also the following Utah cases:
\Vood v. R.G.,V. Ry., 28 Utah 351, 79 P. 182;
Ogden Valley Trout & Resort Co. v. Lewis, 41
Utah 183, 125 P. 687; Board of Education of
Salt Lake City v. West, 55 Utah 357, 186 P.
114; Utah State Building & Loan Ass'n. v.
Perkins et al., 53 Utah 47 4, 173 P. 950; Emerson-Brantingham Implement Co. v. Giles et al.,
59 Utah 54, 202 P. 543; State ex rel. Nichols
r. Cherry, 22 Utah l, 60 P. ll03.
It is evident from the foregoing cases, all directly
in point, that the Plaintiffs' demand for jury trial came
too late, that they had waived their right to a jury trial,
alld that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Plaintiffs' motion at such a late date.
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CONCLUSION
It is evident irom the evidenl'.e, the record, awl 1
exhibits that none of the Defendants have inJur.
the Plaintiffs in any way whatsoever. Plaintitl's sa 11 '"
to convey their property to Happy Y alley Inc. u11r!
the Jessops without retaining a right of way into tlit.
own property. However, they do have a right of i:
to the South of their p1•operty as their property aLu
Rubidoux Road. Neither the Defendant nor Th 1,
Party Defendants have taken away any rights
soever from the Plaintiffs as they never had any
other than what they retained or chose to come)
someone else. The approach and opening
Ly 1:
J e!Wps, which was conveyed by the Plaintiffs to t
J
is as it was and has been for the past nurnen
years. Plaintiffs' property never did abut the r0mh1:
nor did Plaintiffs have a right by prescripti011 to
roadway, the fee of which was formerly owned :
Swaners and which was conveyed by mesne comr
ances to the Defendant, Soter's Inc.
).i

We have here simply a matter and a co11dii
that Plaintiffs have created themselves.
The lower court's Judgment of Dismissal
be affirmed.

20
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